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ThE CASE OF PHYSICIAN SERVICES
ABSTRACT
This paper models the physician services market which is regulated by two government
agencies. The Health Care Financing Administration (I-ICFA) sets Medicare physician fees
through the newly implemented Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS). The Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) sets practice guidelines for quality.
We analyze welfare losses which occur when agencies fail to coordinate their regulatory
activities. Specifically, we consider the welfare impacts for cost, quality, practice characteristics,
and quantity of care.
Perceived ills in the market for physician services, such as excessive expenditures and
overly intensive treatment, may be traced to coordination failures. Thus, even if physicians were
to act as perfect agents for their patients, and even if moral hazard were to be eliminated.
coordination failure could cause the critical problems associated with the physician services
market to persist. Although the model is applied to the market for physician services, it can be
readily generalized to other settings involving multiple regulators.
John A. Rizzo Jody L. Sindelar
Yale University School of Medicine Yale University School of Medicine
P.O. Box 208034 P.O. Box 208034
New Haven, CT 06510 New Haven, CT 06510
and NBERMotivation
This paper models physician services as a market regulated by two governmental agencies,
each concerned with a different aspect of market performance. One branch of the government, the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), currently sets Medicare reimbursement rates while
another branch, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), sets practice or quality
standards for physicians' services. While the standards set are merely guidelines, not rules, there are
potentially costly implications to physicians from ignoring the guidelines.
An important type of regulatory failure occurs when agencies neglect to coordinate their
actions. A growing body of research has found that coordination failures confound government
efforts to implement optimal public policies (Coate 1992; Hansen and Stuart 1989: Kotlikoff 1987;
Veafl 1986; Baron 1984). These studies have typically focused on coordination failures between the
public and private sectors.' Our analysis examines coordination failures among regulatory agencies
involved in different aspects of regulation within a given industry; respectively, price and quality
regulation.
Given the varied institutional contexts in which multiple regulation occurs, formal
representations may be most insightful when tailored to the specifics of each industry (Bernheim and
Whinston 1986).2 In the case of the regulation of the physician services market, coordination failures
occur when two agencies, one charged with price regulation. the other with setting medical practice
guidelines, fail to take full account of each other's actions and goals. Although the basic model may
be generalized to a number of settings, the physician services industry provides a particularly vivid
example, given the current policy concerns about the cost and quality of medical care.
Baron (1984) is an exception to this pattern. He examines coordination failures between
an agency concerned with regulating pollution emissions of a firm (the Environmental
Protection Agency) and a public utility regulator who sets the firm's price.
2Bernheiniand Whinston investigate issues of the nature and existence of equilibrium in a
purely abstract model of multiple regulation. However, as the authors note, 'this task is made
difficult by the proliferation of highly varied institutional contexts in which common agency
appears" (p. 925).The remainder of the paper is divijed into 5 parts. Part 1 discusses the current regulatory
environment under Medicare. Part 2 presents a model of optimal practice guidelines and physician
reimbursement. Part 3 solves the model for the socially optimal case. Part 4 compares outcomes
under coordination failure to the social optimum. In particular, the implications of coordination
failures for cost, quality, medical practice characteristics, and quantity of care are derived. These are
the salient outcomes of concern for health care regulatory agencies and for society. Part 5
summarizes the results and discusses their policy implications.
1. Institutional background
Medicare payments to physicians are now set by HCFA according to the receruly
implemented Resource Based Relative Value Scales (RBRVS). Practice guidelines are continuing to
be developed by AHCPR. These guidelines set standards and try to affect the quality and
appropriateness of care.
IA.Frzdice tuidelines
With the establishment in 1989 of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (A}ICPR),
the federal government made the development of practice guidelines an important component of health
care regulation. AHCPR has initiated work on 16 practice guidelines. The Institute of Medicine and
many other health care organizations are concurrently involved in guideline development3.
Guidelines may be developed in a variety of ways. AHCPR is funding research on outcomes
assessments to aid in the development of guidelines for specific procedures. More common methods
than engaging in original research to develop guidelines are use of literature reviews of available
scientific evidence and/or expert panels.
Over 50 health care organizations are actively involved in the development of practice
guidelines. These organizations include professional groups, third-party payers, hospitals.
academic medical centers, health maintenance organizations, independent researchers, and
malpractice insurers (Physician Payment Review Commission 1992, p. 222).
2Guidelines mayfocuson diagnosis(diagnosticguidelines), evaluation of individual services
(serviceguidelines), or appropriate treatment regimensforspecificconditions (management
guidelines).4 The first two types of guidelines identi' illness and evaluate specific medical
technologies or services, respectively. Management guidelines, however, prescribe appropriate
treatments for an entire episodeofcare for a patient with a given medical condition. At present,
AHCPR is devoting the vast majority of its efforts to the development of diagnostic and management
guidelines (Physician Payment Review Commission (1992).
Such guidelines may have significant effects on physician behavior. First, they may lead
physicians to rethink the type and level of care deemed appropriate. Second, deviations from the
guidelines may impose costs on the physician, such as anxiety or increased malpractice exposure.
lB.Rein burrement
The Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), effective as of January 1, 1992, is part
of Medicare's recent effort to implement a physician fee schedule. The RBRVS computes 'relative
The three main types of guidelines. diagnosis, management, and service, have been
described in a recent Physician Payment Review Commission Report to Congress (1992) as
follows:
Diagnostic guidelines are targeted at evaluating patients with particular symptoms (such
as chest pain) for the presence of diseases that would benefit from intervention (such as
angina or esophagitis). They are also used to guide the screening of asymptomatic
populations for early stages of disease (to detect, for example, hypertension or
diabetes).
Management guidelines cover the evaluation and treatment of patients who are known
to have certain conditions. Examples are guidelines dealing with low back pain or
benign prostatic hypertrophy.
Service guidelines are organized around particular diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
(such as chest X-ray, colonoscopy, appendectomy, or administration of hepatitis
vaccine), presenting appropriate and inappropriate indications for their use (Physician
Payment Review Commission 1992, p. 214).
3values" of physicians' services across specialties. It factors into the relative values the physician's
time, the complexity of services, practice costs, and opportunity costs of medical training.
The RBRVS approach is designed to base reimbursement on the costs of providing care,
rather than on actual charges, which was the previous approach (Hsiao 1988; Hadley 1991). By
itself, the RBRVS is not a fee schedule. However, once relative values have been computed, an
actual fee schedule is obtained by multiplying the RBRVS by a conversion factor. Although intended
to address market imperfections in the physician services market, RBRVS has drawn considerable
criticism from economists.5
2. A model of reimbunement and orcefice ruidelines
The model presented below applies to the physician services market, especially with regard to
the Medicare sector. Physician fees (prices) are set by HCFA, while AHCPR establishes practice
guidelines. In this initial formulation of the model, government agencies engage in non-cooperative
behavior. Cost control is a common objective of each agency.6 For the price setter (HCFA),
practice attributes that affect patient access to and satisfaction with care are additional concerns; for
the guideline setter (AHCPR), quality of care matters in addition to cost.
I4oll (1991), for example, has argued that such problems as the arbitrary nature of
allocating joint costs, and reliance on "an administrative process to construct a competitive
equilibrium in the structure of physician prices' (p. 381) renders the RBRVS approach highly
questionable.
6 Cost control has long been a prominent objective of the Health Care Financing
Administration. Garber and Wagner (1991) have argued that cost containment should be an
important component in the development of practice guidelines as well. They argue that the
public
expects that the resulting guidelines will not only improve the quality of medical
care butwillalso reduce health care costs. (p. 53)
The authors also illustrate how failure to take cost considerations into account will lead to
wasteM health care expenditures.
4Each agency is assumed to take the physician's profit maximizing behaviorintoaccount in
setting price and guidelines. The implications of this model are then compared to the social optimum.
In the social optimum, both agencies cooperate to promote quality and other characteristics, while
controlling cost.
We assume that there is a single payer, Medicare,7 which sets the reimbursement rates for
physician services and pays the entire bill for Medicare patients.' As patients incur no out-of-pocket
expenses for their care, their demand for care is insensitive to price. This simplifying assumption is
reasonable given that: 1) the vast majority of physicians accept Medicare reimbursement as payment
in fill, 2) copayments are relatively small and 3) balance-billing amounts are smaller still.9
We further assume that patients have difficulty judging the appropriateness of medical
treatment. Thus, the physicians alone determine the course of treatment in our model.
2A.Search model
In this model of the physicians' services market, there are many (M) physicians who compete
for patients, and numerous (N) consumers who search for appropriate physicians. As the cost of
Although there is a single payer, Medicare does not exercise its potential monopsony
power. Instead, it sets price with a view to constraining costs while promoting access.
Alternatively, our model applies to the case where a national health insurance system is
introduced, so that there is only one payer (government), but separate governmental branches
set prices and establish practice guidelines. This is a likely situation in some of the health care
reform scenarios.
Gillis, Lee, and Willke (1992) report for example that almost 83% of Medicare Part B
claims are accepted on assignment, so that no balance billing occurs in these cases. The
authors also note that avenge copayments per claim were less than 28 dollars (in 1991 dollars),
while balance billing amounted to less than 7 dollars per claim.
In reviewing balance billing during the mid-1980s, Zuckerrnan and Holahan (1991) concluded
that "balance billing is likely to impose little, if any financial burden on the vast majority of
Medicare beneficiaries" (p. 166). Under the recently implemented Medicare fee schedule, the
amount by which the balance bill may exceed Medicare covered charges is restricted. Thus.
the importance of balance billing has fallen further since the time period examined by
Zuckerman and Holahan. While 2 percent of Medicare beneficiaries incurred total annual
balance bills over $500 in 1988, virtually no patients will incur balance bills of this amount
under the Medicare fee schedule (Physician Payment Review Commission 1992).
5care is paid for entirely by Medicare there is no price competition. Physicians compete for patients
throughnon-price competition,in this case, by offering practice attributes that consumers value.'0
These attributes enhance the attractiveness and accessibilityof the physician." Thissearch model is
based on an earlier model due to Satterthwaite (1979. 1985). As in Satterthwaite (1979), we assume
that physicians and consumers are homogeneous. However, consumers have different preferences
over the attributes offered by physicians. One consumer may prefer physicians j;anotherwill prefer
physician i. However, instead of Satterthwaite's price competition, our model has non-price
competition in the form of medical practice attributes.
The model posits physicians as being in short run equilibrium.'2 In this steady state,
however, patients may leave their current physician in favor of alternative ones. Patients may leave
for demographic reasons such as individuals changing their area of residence. Sonic patients may also
search for new physicians because they are not satisfied with the attributes of their current physicians
and want to search for ones who will appeal to their particular tastes.
For an equilibrium to exist, for each physician, the expected number of patients entering the
practice equals the expected number departing. Following Satterthwaite (1979, 1985). define v as the
probability that a randomly selected consumer from physician i's current practice will come to the
physician for an office visit within a week." We assume that v, is an increasing function of the
10Thatpatients seek desirable attributes is supported in the literature. Surveys indicate
that consumers desire attributes such as convenient location of practice, the availability of a
physician answering service or other coverage at all times, an accessible and friendly demeanor
by the physician toward his patients, good condition of facilities, and so on (Crane and Lynch
1988; MacStravic 1987).
While certain of these attributes may serve as indicators of the physician's technical
skills,theyare unlikely to be particularly informative signals of quality. For attributes to serve
as quality signals, the marginal cost of producing attributes must fall the higher is physician
quality, so that higher quality physicians would typically provide more attributes. However,
this does not necessarily seem to be the case in this market.
The short run is defined as a period of time during which physician supply is fixed. 'Thetime horizon is arbitrary.
6attributes physiciani provides, A1. The physician i therefore expects to have v1N1 patient visits per
week.
Defines as the probability that a randomly chosenmemberof physician i's practice will
decide to leave that practice in any given week, and w1 as the probability that a randomly chosen
consumer who has quit another's practice wilt join physician i's practice. It is assumed that s IS
decreasingin A1, and increasing in the attributes offered by alt other physicians. Further, w1is





Satterthwaite (1979) has shownthat this equilibriumconditionimplies thatthe number of patients
physician i expects to receive, N1, is a decreasing function of his or her price. A symmetric argument
implies that N1 is increasing in attributes A1.
28.Physician behavior
We model physician behavior as consisting of sequential stages. In the first stage, physicians
set the level of attributes to attract patients. In the second stage, given that the attributes level is
already determined, physicians observe their patients' medical needs and decide how to treat them.
Provision of Attributes. In deciding upon the level of attributes to provide, the physician
considers the cost of and expected return on various levels of attributes. Attributes are costly to
provide and costs are increasing in the level of attributes. The expected return from providing more
attributes is two-fold: first is the increased probability of visits (v.) per patient and second is the
expected increase in the number of patients (N.). Each additional visit that the physician provides is
valued by the physician at the rate of profits per visit, ir, that he or she expects to receive. Profits
per visit will depend positively on the price P the physician receives under Medicare. Profits will
7also depend uponthe levelof treatmentthephysician expects to provide to patients, 1'. With new
patientsarrivingandsomeestablished patients leaving, the physician is uncertain in advance as to
whatlevel of care wilt be needed. We assume that the physician basestheexpectedtreatmentlevel
on the treatment level currently provided to established patients)4 Thus,wemaywriteexpected
profits per visit as r =,r(P,fl.
Given expected profits, the representative physician'5 chooses attributes to:
(2)max r(P,V)[v(A)N(A)] -
(A)
where N(A) the perceived number of patients the physician can obtain as a
function of attributes A, dN/dA>0; and
g(A) costs of providing attributes, dgldA>0,and other terms are as
defined above.
Maximizing (2) with respect to A yields A as an increasing function of P." Individually,
the physician perceives that he can obtain more patients, the higher the level of attributes offered.
Since physicians are identical, they all increase attributes in response to a price increase in the same
way. Because the stock of patients is fixed, however, a higher price does not lead to a higher number
of patients treated per physician in equilibrium. in equilibrium, physicians treat an equal, fixed
'Since,as noted earlier, all patients are identical in our model save for their preferences
over physician attributes, physicians' ex-ante expectations about the treatment levels required
will equal actual treatment levels chosen ex-post.
"Sinceall physicians are assumed to be homogeneous, subscripts denoting specific
physicians are deleted from the remainder of the analysis for notational convenience.
"Thesecond order sufficiency conditions for a maximum guarantee that DA/dP >0. To
see this, define Ti'r(P,Tt)[v(A)N(A)] -g(A).Derive the first-order condition for
maximizing Ti', and differentiate this expression with respect to A and P. Rearranging terms
yields: dAJdP =-(dTT/dAdj')/(d2fl/dA2).The denominator is positive by the second order
condition for a maximum, while d2Tr/dAdP =(dir/dP)(dv/dA)(dN/dA)>0.Hence, dA/dP
>0.This formulation is similar to that of Dorfman and Steiner (1954), where attributes in
this model plays a role similar to advertising in their model.
8number ofpatients(N/M). The only effect ofthe price increase is to raise the equilibriumlevel of
attributesprovided.
Since each physician is providing a level of attributes that maximizes his or her net income,
given the attributes provided by every other competitor, this is an equilbrium solution. Also,
becausewe assumesymmetry among physiciansandpatients, the equilibrium will preserve such
symmetry, as Satterthwaite (1979) has noted.
Treatmentlevels. Giventhe physician's patient load and level of attributes, physicians now
observe patient illness severity and decide how to treat them." Physicians are assumed to choose
the level of care that maximizes profits per patient visit. The level of care they choose is a function
of, among other things, the price that HCFA sets arid the guideline that AFICPR sets. Thus, the
physician's objective may be written as:
(3)max [(P -c)T-m(T-Tt)'JvNIM,
(1)
where T = quantityof care per visit provided by the physician;
V quantity of care per visit prescribed by the practice guideline;
m(T - = theinternal costs imposed upon the physician from violating the
guideline;
c = theconstant marginal cost of providing a unit of service, T; and
other terms are as defined above.
Once physicians have obtained their patients, they may have the incentive to renege on
the attributes they offered to entice them. To the extent that attributes take the form of capital
investments, they may be sunk costs which cannot be recovered. Even if it were possible to
renege on promised attributes, however, physicians depend on long term relationships with
their patients, and value their reputations in the community. Breaking their implicit contract
with patients to provide a certain set of attributes is unlikely to be a wise strategy, as it may
cause them to lose patients and send a bad signal to other potential clients. Thus, we assume
that physicians to not renege on their offered attributes cx post.
9The first term in brackets in equation (3) is simply revenue less production cost per visit)8
Physicians receive fee-for-service payment at a rate of P per unit ofT. The second term measures
the practice costs imposed upon the physician from violating the standard. The number of patients
served is fixed in equilibrium (recall that only attributes increase with price).
Costs to the physician that arise from deviating from the standard can come in many forms,
includingpsychic costsof deviating from delivering the best or most appropriate level of care,'9
increased office-related expenditures (e.g.,engagingin additionalrecordkeepingto justify their
departures from the guidelines), increased involvement in medical malpractice litigation, and costs
of responding to managed care inquiries (e.g., filling in extra forms and talking to managed care
representatives). In addition, there may be opportunity costs incurred in the form of foregone
benefits associated with compliance, such as exemption from utilization review or other regulations.
The implications of practice guidelines for medical malpractice is a subject of growing concern
(Physician Payment Review Commission 1992).
The solution to (3) gives the physician's profit maximizing level of services as a function of
price, practice guidelines, and other parameters:
(4)T =(P-c)/s+ T1', where for notational convenience we define s =2m.
ISThephysician also has fixed expenses in the form of providing attributes (g(A)). This
term would merely drop out of equation (2), as fixed costs do not affect the physician's
decision at this point. Thus, we omit such costs for ease of exposition. 'SeeMcGuire and Pauty (1991) for a discussion of psychic costs associated with
demand inducement. Coleman (1990), more generally, discusses internal sanctions that
individuals place on themselves if they deviate from social norms.
Evidence suggests that physicians engage in a significant amount of defensive medicine
(Reynolds, Rizzo, and Gonzalez 1987; Institute of Medicine 1989a, 1989b). It is also
conceivable that physicians whose practice patterns deviate substantively from guidelines may
be subject to greater malpractice insurance premiums.
10XL Rerrslaton' objectives
AHCPR's objectives.AHCPRis chargedwith settingpractice guidelines (TR) to promote
quality of care; it does so by establishing guidelines on quantity of care per visit.Increasingly,
however, the Agency is being urged to take cost considerations into account when setting the
guidelines(Garber and Wagner 1991; Physician PaymentReview Commission 1992).21Hence,we
assume that AHCPR seeks tominimizecostsfromproviding less than the maximumquality of care
andtreatment costs per patient served. This goal may be written as:
(5)mm T(P,Tt) -fl2÷ vrP,TR).
crR)
where'r= thequantity of care that gives the maximum quality:
T(P,TR) = thephysician's profit maximizing I obtained from equation (4)
above;
- = thesocial cost from providing less than
the maximum quality; and
PT = programcosts per patient visit. -
AHCPRrecognizes that quality of care does not increase with quantity of T over the entire
distribution of treatment intensities. While increasing in quantity at first, beyond some point r.
quality declines as problems such as iatrogenic infections, unnecessary surgical procedures or overly
Recently, the Physician Payment Review Commission has explicitly recommended that
A1-ICPR pay attention to cost considerations as well as quality in guideline development:
Practice guidelines should be constructed to help improve the value of healthcare by
addressing its cost as well as quality. The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) should give greater priority to developing practice guidelines.., that could
potentially reduce the amount of resources spent on unnecessary medical care. AHCPR
should specify the elements that should be incorporated in guidelines so that they can be
used to improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of care. All federally
sponsored guidelines should be required to contain these elements to the greatest extent
possible (Physician Payment Review Commission 1992).
11invasive diagnostic tests occur. A variety of such problems have been found to be associated with
increases in delivery of care beyond a certain point (Brook and McGlynn 1991).
Thus, T° is that level of services which maximizes quality of care. This is the gold-standard
for quality of care— the quality of care that consumers would desire if services were costless to them.
Losses to society from less than the maximum quality of care relate to detioris of T from the
quality maximizing level of care (fl. To capture these features while retaining analytical tractability,
we specify a quadratic loss function.
As noted earlier, T represents the quantity of services per medical visit (i.e., the number of
tests, treatments, or medications). As each service is reimbursed at the rate P, PT equals cost of the
care and the charge to Medicare per visit.
Equation (5) says that A}ICPR seeks to minimize the sum of program expenditur& and the
social costs from providing less than the maximum quality. These social costs are higher the further
away is T from T°.
HCFA 's objectives. We assume that HCFA desires to control costs while maximizing
physician accessibility and patient satisfaction. HCFA sets the reimbursement rate, P. knowing that
attributes that patients value 'increase in P. but that costs rise as well. These objectives may be
expressed as:
(6) mm(P- P + PT(P,TR).
(p)
where P° = theprice that elicits the utility maximizing
level of attributes; and
Since the total number of patients treated by all physicians is fixed, nothing is gained
by multiplying (5) by the fixed number of patients treated. Without loss of generality, we may
regard (5) as setting this number equal to 1. With M physicians treating N/M patients each.
total program costs will be found by multiplying PT by the constant N.
12(P - = theone-sided social cost function from providing less than the
utility maximizing level of care.
We refer to the expression (P -P°)1as aone-sided lossfunction because only the range 0 c p <
P°is relevant: given that HCFA is concerned about cost control in addition to service quantity Pwill
always belessthan P°.
This specification, while simple, captures the essence of the tradeoff faced by HCFA.'4 In
the case of Medicare, cost containment is undeniably an important consideration. Equation (6) says
that HCPA seeks to minimize the sum of losses to patients from receiving less than the utility
maximizing level of attributes, and treatment costs. As stated above, it is the cost consciousness
guarantees that HCFA wilt always select a price below P°Y
When price is below F, however, social costs arise because attributes fall below the utility
maximizing level, which occurs when P=P°. Moreover, the further P is below P°. the greater the
shortfall between actual and desired attributes, and the higher the social costs.
All prices and costs are taken to be expressed in terms of some numeraire good. If we
were to drop this assumption, the square of the difference between dollar-denominated prices
would be in units of dollars-squared. We assume that the square of this difference is instead
expressed in terms of a nuzneraire. Thus, P. F, and all other parameters and variables in this
model should be thought of as pure numbers, not as dollar-denominated quantities.
Note that this loss function does no:measurethe full social costs of non-optimal
delivery of care, however. The full social costs include losses from receiving less than the
maximum quality (given by the expression (T(P,TR) -'P)2described above) as well from
receiving less than the utility maximizing level of attributes. The term (P -p0)2 onlymeasures
the latter social costs, which result from UCEA's pricing decisions.
25may be regarded as a 'bliss' point. Beyond this point, the marginal utility of
attributes is zero, or even negative (negative attributes could occur with fawning physicians and
nurses, or information overload).
133. Sobin, the model
3L The social opthnznn
Society is concerned about the provision of attributes, quality, and the cost of care. In the
non-cooperative game, each agency is concerned about costs yet otherwise their goals diverge. In the
cooperative game, agencies coordinate their behavior to minimize the sum of program costs, and
social costs from providing less than the quality maximizing quantity of care and less than the utility
maximizing level of attributes per patient served.
In the cooperative case, given physician behavior described by (4), P and TR are chosen to:
(7) mm (P- fl + (r(P,TR) - 1')2 + PT(P,TR).
(P,D)
Substituting from (4) for T,and minimizing with respect to P and TR gives the optimal levels for P
(8)Y =
(9) 1R'= c/s+(4s+2)r13s -(4+2s)P°/3s,
whereV denotes the equilibrium price for the cooperative game and T denotes the equilibrium
guideline. Substituting (8) and (9) into (4) gives the equilibrium level of care:
(10) V =2(21'-fl/3.
Notethat positive values for V and 'r require that P°>T°/2 and T°>P°12. This we interpret as a
requirement that F and 'P are "not too far apart".1'
4. Coordination failure
This section compares the effects of coordination failures to the social optimum.
Coordination failure stems from non-cooperative behavior between agencies. A}-ICPR seeks to
2Noticethat V will always be less than 1". To see this, note from equation (10)
that T' achieves its maximum value as P° approaches its minimum permissible value, which
must exceed 'P12. When F ='P/2,V ='P. Foralt values of F greater than T°12, we must
have V <'P.
14minin'Jze (5) while HCFA seeks to minimize (6). Each agency observes the solution to the
physician's problem (4).
In choosingprice,HCFA substitutes for T from equation (4) arid then minimizes (6) with
respect toP.taking1R asgiven.Thesolution to thisminimizationproblem gives FICFA's price asa
functionof Ta.Thisis HCFA's reaction function:
(11)p = (2sP°+c)12(1+s) - sT'V2(1+s).
In setting its guideline, AHCPR substitutes for T from (4), and then minimizes (5)with
respect to Ta, taking P as given. The solution to this problem yields AHCPR's reaction function:
(12)TR =c/s+r-(2+s)P/2s.
The Cournot equilibrium is found by solving (11) and (12) for P and 'P, respectively:
(13)P° =2s(2P°-fl/(2+3s)
(14) T= c/s + 4(1+s)T°k2+3s) -(4+2s)P°/(2+3s),
where the superscript "C0' indicates the equilibrium solution given coordination failure. Substituting
(13) and (14) into (4)givesthe equilibrium actual level of care:
(15)T<' =[(4s+2)r-2sP°]/(2+3s).
Having derived the equilibrium levels for price, and the actual level of care provided, we are
ready to compare the implications of coordination failures for the outcomes of interest.
4A...Prke/Altributes
Theeffects of coordination failure on price and hence attributes may be found by subtracting
equation (8) from (13) yielding:
(16) r-- =4(2P°-T°)13(2+3s)<0.
Thus, coordination failure leads to a lowerpriceand fewer attributes than are socially optimal. The
reason is that, under non-cooperative behavior, HCFA fails to recognize the indirect effect of price on
the attributes associated with the provision of care. HCFA chooses a lower price than is socially
optimal because it fails to recognize that a higher price increases the patient-desired attributes of care.
15The lower price in the noncooperative case increases the social costs from providing less than the
utility-maximizing level of attributes of care.2'
4B.QygUliv
The net effect of coordination failure on quantity of services is the difference between
equations (15) and (10):
(17)'r--'r =2(2P°-fl13(2+3s) >0.
Thus,with coordination failure, the quantity of services exceeds the social optimum.
The changes in price and practice guidelines under coordination failure relative to the social
optimum exert competing influences on the actual quantity of services provided. On the one hand,
the lower price under coordination failure decreases the amount of care provided, ceteris paribus. On
the other hand, the lower price increases the need to set a high practice guideline, and in fact the
guideline under coordination failure is higher than in the cooperative case.Th The higher guideline
exerts a positive effect on actual treatment levels. The latter effect dominates, so that quantity of care
is higher in the cooperative case.
4C Oualiiv
The implications of coordination failure for quality of care are straightforward. First, observe
that T° is always less than r. This, together with the fact that Tc >T(see equation (17)), implies
that the quantity of care is closer to r under coordination failure than under cooperation. Thus,
'Undercooperative behavior, the indirect effect of HCFA's pricing decision is taken into
account: HCFA realizes that a higher price raises the profit maximizing intensity of care, as
can be seen from equation (4). Since D is always less than r (see footnote 26), a higher price
also raises quality of care under cooperative behavior. Thus, in the cooperative situation,
HCFA realizes that a higher price serves the socially valuable function of lowering the social
costs from inappropriate care. This creates an additional incentive to raise priceinthe
cooperative case.
-
aSubtracting the socially optimal practice guideline (9) from the equilibrium guideline
under coordination failure (14) and siinpliring terms yields: (4+2s)(2P°-fl/3s(2+3s) >0
(recallthat positivity of P requires that P°> r/2— see equation (8) in the text).





Whethercost exceeds or falls short of the social optimum depends upon the ratio P°/T°: high values
of this ratio lead to excessive cost relative to the social optimum, while low values lead to the
opposite result?9 In particular, we have:
(19)P''T° -PT>0as pop >(8+15s)I(4+12s).°
<
Thus, if society desires a high level of attributes per unit of medical treatment, P°/V will be
high and coordination failure will lead to excessive expenditures. On the other hand, if attributes are
little valued, coordination failure leads to insufficient expenditure relative to the social optimum. One
interpretation of this has interesting implications. It seems likely that attributes will be much more
valued in advanced economies (FIT° will be relatively large), than in underdeveloped ones, where no
frills medical care is derigueur.This, in turn, suggests that coordination failure may work
differently in developed and underdeveloped economies, leading to excessive health care expenditures
in the former, but insufficient spending in the latter. An interesting issue is how different reform bills
High values of P°/T° may be considered to represent a high value placed on desirable
attributes of care relative to medical quality of care. Thus low P'/T° may represent the 'no
fringes' provision of health care while higher values of p°ir represent higher provision of
attributes relative to medical quality per se.
XNoticethat, as a becomes arbitrarily small, the range of permissible values for F/T°
for which P'T -PT>0becomes. smaller and smaller. There will always be a permissible
range for P°/T° over which ptC1c >PT,however. This is because the second order
conditions for a social optimum require that s >0.But s >0allows P"T1' >VT'for
values of P°/T° between 1.25 and 2 (the precise cutoff point depending on the value of s),
which is in the permissible range for P°/T°.
17would value attributes relativetomedicalquality as this would,under the likely scenario of
cootdination failure,affect expectations about expense.
5. Conclusion
The model we have presented examines coordination failures arising when two different arms
of government implement policies designed to affect the physician services market. Coordination
failure among govenunental agencies has implications for price, attributes, quantity, quality, and cost
of care. For example, coordination failure raises the quantity and quality of service above the social
optimum, while price and patient-desired attributes of care are less than their socially optimal levels.
Although excessive costs and treatment levels are popularly attributed to moral hazard and/or
self-interested behavior by physicians, our model traces such problems to coordination failure among
regulatory agencies as well. Thus, even if physicians were perfect agents and health insurance
contracts were to eliminate moral hazard, problems of excessive costs and an over provision of care
could persist.
The basic approach of the model, which emphasizes social costs of coordination and
information failures, applies well to other health care markets. For example, some health care
markets— such as the market for renal dialysis— are regulated by both state and federal governments.
yielding the same sorts of issues posed here (Brown, Smith, and Sindelar 1992). Other industries to
which the insights of our approach would apply include public utilities, banking, and agriculture.
The results of our model suggest that cooperation and information exchange among regulatory
branches should be pursued. Cooperation may be promoted through informal channels or more
format arrangements such as consolidating the activities of regulatory agencies into larger
departments. With dramatic changes in the organization and finance of health care on the horizon,
these issues may assume even greater importance.
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